Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - Sullivan, Veronica (2019-01-07) by unknown
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
NYS Supreme Court Decisions in Article 78 
Proceedings Court Litigation Documents 
Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - Sullivan, Veronica 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd 
1ooe&S/2018 IAS PAAT 3ol Sf<l 01 P£TITION IS GRANT£0AS PER ATTACIEO OECISK>NIOROER. POQt 1 olt1 
SVPREM.E COURT OF· THE STATE OF NEWYORR 
NEW YORK ·couNTY 
PRESSNT.: 
Index Number: 100865/2018 
SULLIVAN, VERONICA 
NYS BOARD OF PAROLE, TINA 
Sequence Number : 001 
ARTICLE 78 
PART 30 
INDEX· NO •. ___ _ 
i40liON DATE ___ _ 
MOTIOPf SEQ. N'o.,.___ _ 
The f0If1,1wjog f>'lpers,.numbered.11o· -i. were JJNtd on tJJ~ mp~n toi'foi' .. ._ ....;.---- --------.......... 
N.otJ~.of·MoflOn/O.rderto :Show.Cari"-Affidavffs·-Exhlbfts INt>(s) • ._ ___ _ 
Ms.liVG.tlng-AffldaV?tS-..:. EXhlbJts . ______ _.._____....._......._ _ .....,....,____ 
. f'N0(•1~- ---­
f.No(•~·-----.Ri ·iui:.... AftidrMts tp~,"'~ · . . -----------------------,.----...,..-
,1, .CHECK Ot4~ .~ ........ "~"'''"" .. ,~,·~··'"!••'>(••• ........ , .. -<··········... 0 t:~ 01sposer>-
2. CHECK AS APPROPRIATE: !""""•·~~,..,.~.,.!"''MC.>TrON IS; m~- 0 .PENl!E[). 
3. CH.ECK IF A'P'PROPWATE~ .... ~ ..... n.................................... 0 SETTLE ·ORDER 
. . 
F ·I Le D 
· JAN: 1 0 '20f! 
COUNTY CLERl(IS OFFICE 
N~YORK 
..s:~~~~::U.-b4-....:.· .J;s:c. 
N VICTORIA ST. EORGE 
81fc)N-FtNAL O~IK\!WON :a .. ~~ · 
Q .GRANJEO lN PART :[}OTHER 
QstJSMiT :ORbEtrt 
ODO NOT POST 0 FtOUQIARY ArPOINTMENT OW.ERENCC 
Pliotoct 1/1<11201t 
100805/2018 !AS ?AllT:lol SEQ 01 PETITION IS GRANTEOAS PERATIACH.EP DECISION/ORDER. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
NEWYORKCOUNTY: IASPART34 
----------------------------------------------------------------------X 
In the Matter of VERONICA SUL LIV AN, 
Petitioner, 
-against-
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, Tina 
Stanford, Chairwoman, 
Respondent. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------X 
Carmen Victoria St. George, J.S.C.: 
Index No. 
Motion Sequence 
Decision, Order 
and Judgment 
FILED 
JAN 1 0 2019 
COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE 
NEW YORK 
On December 17, 1992, 78-year-old Sophia Seretta was stabbed and strangled in her 
apartment. Ms. Seretta' s neighbor was the mother of petitioner Veronica Sullivan. Petitioner was 
25-years-old at the time and a habitual drug user. On the night in question, petitioner purchased 
crack cocaine on the street. Shortly thereafter, she has stated, she met a man named Joaquim who 
followed her into the apartment building where petitioner's mother and Ms. Sereha lived. 
According to petitioner, she entered Ms. Ser~tta's apartment to pay for some knitting work the 
woman had done for petitioner's mother. Petitioner has stated that Joaquim then stabbed and 
strangled Ms. Seretta and stole her television set. At the parole hearing at issue in this proceeding, 
petitioner acknowledged that she did not attempt to stop Joaquim. Instead, petitioner said, she left 
the apartment in a panic and did not report the incident. .\0 
The following day, petitioner spoke with the police. The investigating officer stated th1it 
petitioner's hands and elbow were bruised, and that petitioner had no explanation for her injuries. 
Petitioner infonned the police about Joaquim and she accused him of murdering Ms. Seretta. In 
1994, however, petitioner was tried and convicted of the murder. Prior to this point, petitioner's 
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sole conviction had been for the misdemeanor crime of petit larceny, for which she received,~ 
sentence of a conditional discharge. 
The sentencing hearing took place on April 26, 1994. At the hearing, one of the victim's 
daughters made a statement in which she asked that petitioner be punished to the full extent of the 
law. Petitioner made a statement in which she proclaimed her innocence, vowed to appeal her 
conviction, and accused the victim's daughter and family of lying about petitioner's involvement, 
perhaps due to the anesting officer~s misleading comments about her. In his comments, the judgt 
mentioned that petitioner's bloody fingerprints had been found on Ms. Seretta's watch case. H~ 
imposed the maximum sentence, 25 years to life, and recommended that petitioner not be paroled 
at any time. Petitioner is incarcerated ~t Bedford Hills Correctional Facility (Bedford Hills). 
Prior to her transfer to Bedford Hills, petitioner married Vernon Blyther, a longtime MTA 
employee. The two have been married for 25 years. While at Bedford Hills, petitioner has 
completed several mandatory and recommended therapeutic programs. These include sev~Rtl 
Alternative to Violence sessions and the Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment Prograffi 
(ASAT). After her completion of the Alternative to Violence programs, petitioner participated in 
the program as an inmate-facilitator. In addition, petitioner, who graduated frorr.i high school with 
a GED, took college courses during her incarceration, eventually receiving a Bachelor's degree 
from Marymount Manhattan College. Petitioner additionally became a certified graphic arts 
. " 
technician following her completion of a three~year graphic arts apprenticeship. Further, for 1°' 
;,, 
years petitioner has worked at Hour Children, an organization within the prison which works tO 
strengthen bonds between incarcerated mothers and their children. She also is a volunteer tutor for 
Marymount College. Pe~itioner's disciplinary record also is worthy of note. Though during the 
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early years of her imprisonment petitioner committed infractions, her record has been untarnished 
since 2001. 
Limited credit time allowances (LCTA) against an individual's sentence are permissible 
under 7 NYCRR § 290.1-290.4. An inmate's sentence may be reduced if he or she successfully 
{ 
completes an Associates or Bachelor's degree program during incarceration (7 NYCRR § 290.2 
[d] [1]).1 Such credit, moreover, is allowed only if the inmate has not "committed a 'serio~ 
disciplinary infraction' or maintained an overall poor institutional record' during the current ten£ 
of incarceration" (7 NYCRR § 290.2 [b]). lf an LCTA is granted, the inmate is entitled to an earlier 
parole hearing. In the case at hand, petitioner's academic studies, which earned her a Bachelor's 
degree, her lack of a serious disciplinary infraction, and her good overall institutional record, 
~ntitled her to an LCTA. Therefore, she appeared before respondent six months early, in March 
2017. Respondent denied her application for parole at that time. This denial is not at issue here.· 11:> 
Next, she appeared before the board on August 8, 2017, pursuant to her regular parDra 
schedule. Among the papers petitioner submitted in support of her 2017 applications is a January 
13, 2017 letter from the National Lawyers Guild's Parole Preparation Project, which vigorously 
supported petitioner's application. The letter pointed to petitioner's warm, generous nature, the 
strong support of her family, and her diligent work to maintain her sobriety2, the development of 
her anger management skills, and the sense of support and community she created with and amorig 
her fellow inmates. The letter noted that due to petitioner's good behavior she has lived in Fisk~ 
Honor Housing since 2007. In addition to discussing her educational advances and her work 
experience, the letter commended petitioner for her volunteer and charity work, including her 
tutoring activities and her knitting project (knitting scarves and helmet warmers for troops in 
1 There are numerous other ways this credit may be obtained, but they are not relevant to this proceeding. 
2 According to the letter, petitioner has maintained her sobriety throughout her time at Bedford Hiils. 
3 
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Afghanistan. Finally, the letter stated that petitioner has two employment offers pending, botli 
outgrowths of her work with inmates and with inmates and their children, and she additionally 
intends to pursue her avocations, graphic arts, knitting, and photography. 
In addition, petitioner submitted letters in support of her application. Petitioner's husband, 
sisters, and several nieces and a nephew, all wrote on petitioner's behalf. Her sister, Margarite 
Sullivan, noted that although petitioner continued to maintain her innocence, she had taken full 
' 
,. 
responsibility for the consequences of her actions, including the death of Ms. Seretta. Reverenl:l 
Sharon White~Harrigan, a licensed social worker who also heads a transitional homeless shelter 
for women after their release from jail, called petitioner a dynamic speaker, excellent role model, 
and compassionate individual who can help women transition from jail to the shelter and then to 
better lives. She also guaranteed petitioner a job upon her release. Aileen Baumgartner, the directdi 
of the Bedford Hills College Program, which coordinates with Marymount College, wrote abo\li 
petitioner's intelligence, dedication, and her gen~rosity and willingness to help others. Othef 
instructors also commended petitioner. Two of petitioner's fellow inmates wrote that petitioner 
helped them move forward with their lives in more positive directions, getting one of them a job 
at the parenting center, and assisting the other with her anger and trust issues while also supporting 
and facilitating the woman's relationship with her daughter and her aging mother. 
·., 
Respondent also had petitioner's behavioral record at its disposal. Significantly, among th~ 
documents before respondent was petitioner's COMPAS report. COMPAS, which stands for 
Correctional Offenders Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions, is widely used in New 
York and elsewhere to assist in the evaluation of parole applicants. Essentially, it takes a number 
of factors, and plugs them into an algorithm which helps predict the parole applicant's likelihood 
4 
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of recidivism (see Matter of Rossalds v New York State Board of Parole [Rossakis J, 146 AD3d 22, 
25 n 2 [1st Dept 2016]). 
Petitioner's parole hearing took place on August 8, 2017. Respondent noted that early in 
her incarceration petitioner had amassed several infractions, but she had not had any problems 
since 2001. Upon inquiry, petitioner opined that it took her time to adjust to her situation. 
Respondent stated that petitioner's COMP AS scores were excellent, as she scored as a low risk for 
prison misconduct, propensity for future violence, and subsequent criminal problems. Respondent 
noted that her history of violence score was in the medium range because of the severity of her 
crime. Petitioner still maintained that She did not commit the murder, but she acknowledged that 
she was the catalyst for the crime ~ecause she allowed the murderer to enter the victim's apartment, 
that she was wrong to run away from the crime scene rather than intercede, and that she improperly 
did not say anything to the police that evening. The parole hearing focused also on the pre-sen ten de 
investigation and on petitioner's comments about the victim's family during the sentencing 
hearing. Petitioner again expressed her apology for the family's loss. She stated that her callous 
comments during the sentencing hearing were immature and inconsiderate, and that she should 
have treated the family with more sympathy and consideration. Respondent discussed the 
additional materials it had received since the March 2017 hearing, including the letters in suppdif: 
from her academic program and the Hour Childre~'s Center. 
After the hearing, respondent denied petitioner's parole application. It stated, as the reasons 
for the denial: 
This panel has concluded that your release to supervision is not 
compatible with the welfare of society and therefore parole is 
denied. This finding is made following a personal interview, record 
review and deliberation. 
5 
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Of significant concern is your course of conduct during the instant 
offense of murder 2nd where an elderly female known to you was 
viciously attacked with a knife causing death. The factors 
considered include your admission that you were under the 
influence of drugs and in the residence when the crime occurred. 
You also admit that despite your shock at what occurred you failed 
to immediately go to authorities for help. In addition, Your 
comments during sentencing were noted, including those directed at 
the grieving relatives of the victim. Your document submissions, 
case plan,. COMPAS report and programming are positive. Your 
behaviour {sic} early in the sentence was marginal but has improved 
since July 2001. Required statutory factors have been considered, 
including your risk to the community, rehabilitation efforts, and 
your needs for successful community reintegration. 
To grant you a release at this time would so deprecate the 
seriousness of your offense as to undermine respect for the law. 
;'·'. 
Petitioner filed an appeal, which respondent denied on March 29, 2018. Citing Executive 
Law (Exec. Law)§ 259-i (2) (c) (A), respondent noted that an inmate is not released "merely as a 
reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while con.fined but after considering if 
there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, [she] will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that [her] release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and 
will not so deprecate the seriousness of [her] crime as to undermine respect for the law." 
Respondent determined that the board considered all the factors delineated in the statute, andvfi 
noted the high degree of discretion the board has in reaching its conclusions. Respondent found 
that it was appropriate to rely on the severity of petitioner's offense along with her comments 
during sentencing. According to respondent, the board also rationally relied on the fact that 17 
y~ars before the hearing petitioner had committed some behavioral infractions. Respondent found 
that, although there was not a probability that petitioner would violate the law if released, the board 
rationally concluded that her release was incompatible with the welfare of society and wottlU 
deprecate the seriousness of her crime. Further, respondent stated, the board's decision wiS 
6 
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sufficiently specific, and its decision not to rely on petitioner's COMP AS scores did not necessitate 
discussion. The law iequiring such explanation was not in effect until the month after the parole 
hearing, respondent says. 
"In this Article 78 proceeding, petitioner seeks a judgment by this Court which annut~ 
~ .' 
respondent's denial of her parole application and remits the matter to respondent for a de nova 
hearing. Resp.ondent held a video conference parole hearing with petitioner on August 8, 2017 and 
issued its determination the same day. The current proceeding challenges the August 8 decision as 
irrational. Petitioner argues that respondent improperly based its decision solely on the severity of 
the crime. Respondent counters that it properly considered all relevant factors and issued a rational 
order well within the scope of its discretionary powers and should therefore be affirmed. For~~ 
reasons below, the Court grants the petition and remits the matter to respondent for further revieW: 
DISCUSSION 
"In an artiCle 78 petitioner challenging a parole decision, the petitioner bears the burden to 
show that the decision is the result' of irrationality bordering on impropriety and is thus arbitrary 
and capricious" (Rossakis, 146 AD3d at 26). This burden is a heavy one (Garcia v New York Statt 
•' .· Div. of Parole, 239 AD2d 235, 239 [!st Dept 1998]). Therefure, judicial review of a parole boatil 
determination is "narrowly circwnscribed" (Matter of Coleman v New York State Dept. of 
Correction and Community Supervision, 157 AD3d 672, 672 [2nd Dept 2018]). The Board must 
consider all applicable statutory factors, including_ the inmate's institutional record, her release 
plan, impact statements by the victim's representative, the seriousness of the offense, the 
sentencing and pre-sentencing reports, mitigating and aggravating factors after the inmate's arre~ 
and the imnate's prior criminal record (Exec. Law§ 259-i [2] [c] [A]). The board need not discri~ 
each of the factors· or weigh them equally (Rossakis, 146 AD3d at 27). 
7 
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Despite the deference with which courts review a parole board's detennination, courts do 
not rubber stamp a parole denial. Where the record shows that the board did not fairly consider 
•!,• 
each of the factors, "the courts must intervene" (Matter of King v New York State Div. of Paro!¢; 
--:~ 190 AD2d 423, 431 [1st Dept 1993], ajf'd, 83 NY2d 788 [1994]). For example, under 9 NYCRR 
8002.3 (b), whenever the board denies a parole application it must provide the ~ate a writing 
which includes detailed reasons for the decision "in factually individualized and non-conclusory 
terms." The board must consider only the relevant statutory factors (see Matter of Kingv New York 
State Div. of Parole, 83 NY2d 788, 791 [1994]), and it must give those factors adequate 
'• 
. 
consideration (see Matter of Mitchell v New York State Div. of Parole, 58 AD3d 742, 742-43 [2tf<l 
'.'.l 
··~ 
Dept 2009}). As a result of these standards, board decisions which merely include a list of dii 
inmate's achievements and progress and track the language of the Executive Law regarding the 
hannful impact of release on society and the deprecation of the serious nature of the offense which 
would result from the inmate's release can suggest that the Board's decision violated the statutory 
mandates (see Rossakis, 146 AD3d at 28). In addition, although the COMP AS score is not binding 
.. ;: 
on the parole board (see Dawes v Annucci, 122 AD3d 1059, 1060-61 [3rd Dept 2014]), it is ill\ 
"' '~1·
important factor which the parole board must duly consider (see Symes v New York State Board bj 
Parole, 117 AD3d 959, 959 [2nd Dept 2014]). Indeed, the COMPAS score is so critical that the 
failure to consider it adequately mandates a remand (see Symes, 117 AD3d at 959; Kennedy v New 
York State Board of Parole, 117 AD3d 948, 949 [2nd Dept 2014]); Malerba v Evans, 109 AD3d 
1067 [3rd Dept 2013], Iv denied, 22 NY3d 858 [2014]). ·" 0 
··,; 
.,:J 
There is another significant limitation on the discretion of the parole board. Where th~ 
, .... 
,'; 
petitioner makes "a convincing showing" that the board reached its determination "based a/mo}}. 
exclusively on the nature and seriousness of the offense," the decision may be overturned (Matter 
8 
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of Wallman v Travis, 18 AD3d 304, 307 [!st Dept 2005] [emphasis supplied]). Although the 
underlying crime is "acutely relevant," the parole board must consider other relevant statutory 
.;;\~ 
factors. As the First Department has stated, "[a] Parole Board's exclusive reliance on the severiiJ 
of the offense to deny parole not only contravenes the discretionary scheme mandated by statute, 
but also effectively constitutes an unauthorized resentencing of the defendant" (Wallman, 18 AD3d 
at 307-08). 
In the proceeding at hand, the Court concludes that respondent did not engage in the type 
of review that the statute and regulations require. Instead, respondent relied almost exclusively ~}i 
' -~ 
the seriousness of the crime, with a brief mention of the statements petitioner had made 25 yeaf:S 
earlier at her sentencing hearing. Respondent noted but did not discuss the weight of petitioner's 
minor infractions prior to 200 I or her clean record for the past 17 years. The decision refers only 
fleetingly to petitioner's overwhelmingly positive submissions, her plans upon release, and her 
COMP AS score, the latter of which predicted a low probability of recidivism; and, it does n~.t 
explain how these factors weighed in the parole denial decision. As stated, the CO:tvfP A~ 
instrument is "intended to bring the Board into compliance with ... amendments to [the ExecutlV~ 
Law]" (Matter of Malerba v Evaus, 109 ad3D 1067, 1068 [3rd Dept 2013]; see Pulinario v New 
York State Dept. of Correction and Community Supervision, 42 Misc 3d 1232 (A), 2014 NY Slip 
Op 5030! (U), *'*4 [Sup Ct NY County 2014]), and respondent's failure to evaluate these factors 
is problematic. 
Respondent's written conclusions that 1) petitioner's ~lease was incompatible with~ 
welfare of society and 2) her release would deprecate the seriousness of her offense and therefri~ 
undermine respect for the law merely track the statutory language, without explanation or contex. 
Thus, the Court cannot evaluate their rationality (see Rossakis, 146 AD3d at 28). Inmates are 
9 
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rele~ed on parole following murder convictions without doing this sort of damage, and respondent 
provides no information showing why it concludes that such a risk exists here. Furthermore, there· 
is no "explanation of why the [25] year old crime outweighed the voluminous evidence that 
indicates [petitioner] would presently be able to live a quiet and crime-free life in society" 
(Pulinario, 42 Misc 3d 1232 (A), 2014 NY Slip Op 50301 (U), *4] [remanding to parole board, 
_ which denied parole to petitioner in 17-year-old murder case]). For these reasons, it is 
ORDERED that the petition is granted; and it is further 
ORDERED that the matter is remanded to respondent for~ de novo hearing. 
ENTER: 
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